Limit theorems for reflected Ornstein–Uhlenbeck processes

This paper studies one‐dimensional Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) processes, with the distinguishing feature that they are reflected on a single boundary (put at level 0) or two boundaries (put at levels 0 and d > 0). In the literature, they are referred to as reflected OU (ROU) and doubly reflected OU (DROU), respectively. For both cases, we explicitly determine the decay rates of the (transient) probability to reach a given extreme level. The methodology relies on sample‐path large deviations, so that we also identify the associated most likely paths. For DROU, we also consider the ‘idleness process’ L_t and the ‘loss process’ U_t, which are the minimal non‐decreasing processes, which make the OU process remain ≥ 0 and ≤ d, respectively. We derive central limit theorems (CLTs) for U_t and L_t, using techniques from stochastic integration and the martingale CLT.     

Price Discrimination with Private and Imperfect Information

In this paper, I investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer's brand preference. I show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them, then they charge more to these consumers, and this price has an inverse U‐shaped relationship with the signal's accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal's accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.     

The Discriminating Beta: Prices and Capacity with Correlated Demands

Uniform customer‐class pricing can do much of the work of congestion‐based or time‐of‐day pricing in communication or wireless networks. A monopolist exploits differences in the stochastic characteristics of demands. If demands are correlated and the firm faces a capacity constraint, then it can set prices to reduce the variability of aggregate demand, thereby reducing the probability of excess demand and the associated service quality deterioration. Demands that covary negatively with aggregate demand are valuable to the firm in much the same way that securities that covary negatively with the market are valuable in a stock portfolio. Customer classes that exhibit low covariance with aggregate demand realize lower optimal prices. Optimal capacity is also affected by these covariances. As long as demands are not perfectly positively correlated, expected costs of joint production are less than expected costs of serving demands separately.     

Quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage in supply‐managed industries

The Canadian dairy, egg, broiler, and turkey industries operate under supply management, a policy regime that sets product prices and allocates production among provinces and ultimately among farms through quotas. The Canadian Farm Products Agencies Act requires that comparative advantage be used to guide the allocation of new quota when increases in consumer demand necessitate increased production. This requirement, however, has not been met in practice. We develop a proposal by Meilke to use quota prices as measures of comparative advantage. We evaluate the quota price approach and other proposed methods, from a Hayekian and Coasean market process perspective. We conclude that quota prices offer an economically justifiable indicator of provincial comparative advantage. We develop an individual‐level general equilibrium model of quota exchange to illustrate the informational content of quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage. We also discuss potential practical challenges of using quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage.     

Oil risk contracts,business conduct and performance patterns: Data panel analysis

Using the economic and financial performance data of international companies for the exploration, and exploration–extraction (E&E) of oil, as well as the patterns of institutional situation and orientation with the government market and national oil companies or NOCs that receive project offers, we analyze the institutional development and behavior patterns by type of E&E contract, following the strategic actor approach, or the so-called agency theory. Additionally, in light of Mexico's energy reform being implemented between 2015 and 2019, we analyzed the types of license contracts compared to those for production and shared profit. Subsequently, it was determined-through panel data methods in the analysis of 17 companies between 2005 and 2015-that global companies present bigger yields and commitments compared to specialized companies, confirmed by their net income and returns on equity or ROE.     

Reassessing marketing boards as hybrid arrangements: evidence from Canadian experiences

In this article, we reassess the role of marketing boards and similar arrangements that have played an important role in numerous agro‐food sectors of developed countries over almost a century. Referring to transaction cost economics and to more recent contributions on the allocation of decision and property rights, we interpret these arrangements as hybrid modes of governance. We hypothesize that uncertainty is the leading force pushing toward these organizational solutions and we explore forms of uncertainty at stake and their impact in shaping various types of hybrids. We also explore the role of institutional embeddedness in providing marketing boards and the like their legitimacy. Using numerous examples from Canadian marketing boards, we discuss the benefits and point out flaws of these arrangements. We conclude on the need to assess comparatively the role of these solutions with respect to, for example, a system of bilateral contracts.     

ON THE PROFITABILITY OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE WHEN DEMAND IS UNCERTAIN

A previous study finds that in a market where a manufacturer faces uncertain demand and sells to consumers through competitive retailers, the manufacture wishes to support adequate retail inventories by imposing resale price maintenance (RPM). I show that if retail inventories are allocated to consumers through first‐come‐first‐served rule rather than efficient rationing rule in the game with unconstrained retail competition, imposing RPM may not be profitable. It may not encourage more retail inventories either. RPM may also lower consumer surpluses and social welfare. This study casts some doubt on the demand uncertainty theory that supports RPM.     

Consumer sorting and hedonic valuation of wine attributes: exploiting data from a field experiment

This article uses a novel experimental approach to measure consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for wine attributes. We invited customers of a local supermarket who had selected a bottle of wine to purchase to participate in a valuation experiment. Integrating their original wine choice into the experiment, each participant evaluated six alternative wines, generating a rich set of data on willingness to pay and consumer characteristics. The data from the experiment allow us to compare standard shelf price‐based wine attribute valuation estimates with estimates using WTP data and an increasing amount of information about individual consumers. The full model employs individual fixed effects to estimate WTP parameters without bias from consumer sorting or supply side influences. Our WTP estimates for wine attributes differ markedly from previous attribute value estimates. Consumers in our sample display clear and stable preferences for wine varieties, but less clear preferences for appellations. Our results suggest caution is needed in using market prices to estimate parameters of the consumer valuation function for product attributes.     

The stained China miracle: Corruption,regulation, and firm performance

Regional corruptness in China has a positive effect on the profitability of private firms, but not that of state-owned firms. A natural experiment of exogenous trade policy change suggests that corruption may help private firms circumvent government regulation.     

Location and ownership of public goods

We introduce location choice for the public good in the property rights framework. We find that it can be optimal to separate location from ownership.